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S
BY WENLI LI
What Do We Know About Chapter 13
Personal Bankruptcy Filings?
ince 1980, the number of households filing 
for bankruptcy has more than tripled. This 
drastic increase in personal bankruptcy 
filings led to substantial debate among 
economists and policymakers. That debate subsequently 
resulted in the enactment of extensive reforms in 2005 
when Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act. Ultimately, the rationale 
for this legislation is the presumption that Chapter 
13 leads to more appropriate outcomes compared 
with either Chapter 7 filings or other options outside 
bankruptcy. In this article, Wenli Li outlines the results 
of two recent studies that have taken a more detailed 
look at actual outcomes in Chapter 13.
The U.S. personal bankruptcy 
filing rate has gone up dramatically 
for the past two decades. In 1980, for 
every 1,000 households, only four filed 
for bankruptcy. Today, the number 
has more than tripled. About one-
third of the bankruptcies were filed 
under Chapter 13 (Figure 1). The U.S 
personal bankruptcy code has two key 
features: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. 
Under Chapter 7, debtors sacrifice part 
of their assets in exchange for a dis-
charge of their debts. Under Chapter 
13, debtors sacrifice part of their future 
earnings in exchange for a partial 
discharge of their debts. This drastic 
increase in personal bankruptcy filing 
rates led to substantial debate, aca-
demic as well as legislative, and finally 
resulted in the enactment of extensive 
bankruptcy reforms in 2005 with the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act. The core of the legal reform is 
to further restrict debtors’ access to 
Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy and to 
force some debtors to file under Chap-
ter 13 or not at all, so that debtors with 
sufficient income would be forced to 
repay at least part of their debt through 
their future earnings.1
Ultimately, the rationale for this 
legislation is the presumption that 
Chapter 13 leads to more appropriate 
outcomes (for some debtors) com-
pared with either Chapter 7 or options 
outside of bankruptcy. But what do 
debtors and creditors really achieve 
under Chapter 13? Or more important, 
how does the Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
system serve its two conflicting objec-
tives: to provide debtors with a partial 
financial fresh start by discharging 
some of their debt, and to help credi-
tors collect their defaulted loans by 
enforcing debtors’ obligation to repay? 
Two recent studies have taken a 
more detailed empirical look at actual 
outcomes in Chapter 13. One is my 
study with Hülya Eraslan and Pierre-
Daniel Sarte, and the other is a study 
by Scott Norberg and Andrew Velkey.
FEATURES OF U.S.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
The key feature of U.S. personal 
bankruptcy law, both before and after 
passage of the 2005 reform act, is that 
it contains two basic types of bank-
ruptcy proceedings: Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13. Before passage of the 2005 
reform act, a debtor’s bankruptcy deci-
sion and choice between chapters were 
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1Some of the other significant changes 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act introduced to 
bankruptcy doctrine include increasing the 
amount of paperwork that must be filed by every 
debtor; requiring pre-filing counseling and 
post-filing financial education for debtors whose 
debts are primarily consumer debts; and making 
Chapter 13 less attractive by, among other 
things, requiring five-year payment plans (for 
above-median debtors) rather than the three-
year plans that were previously the norm.mostly voluntary. The 2005 reform act 
abolished some debtors’ right to choose 
between chapters. To file under Chap-
ter 7, debtors whose incomes are above 
their state median family income must 
now pass a “means test” that requires 
that (i) their monthly income net of 
allowable expenses calculated accord-
ing to IRS rules be less than $166.67 
per month and (ii) their net monthly 
income multiplied by 60 be less than 
25 percent of their unsecured debt.2 If
their incomes are above the median 
level and they fail the means test, debt-
ors must file under Chapter 13 if they 
file for bankruptcy at all.
Chapter 7 is often called liquida-
tion. Under Chapter 7, a debtor gives 
up all of his assets above a certain 
exemption level. In exchange, the 
debtor gets almost all of his unsecured 
debt discharged. The exemption level 
varies with states. A debtor cannot file 
for bankruptcy for six years after the 
last filing.
Chapter 13 is also called a wage 
earner’s plan. Under Chapter 13, a 
debtor gets to keep all of his assets. 
However, he must repay some of the 
unsecured debt out of future earnings 
through a repayment plan over three 
to five years. Only after the completion 
of the repayment plan will the debtor 
obtain a legal discharge of his remain-
ing debts. In principle, a debtor can 
file for Chapter 13 repeatedly without 
a time limit between the two adjacent 
filings. In practice, bankruptcy courts 
often require a 180-day gap.
A debtor can also choose to 
remain delinquent on his loans with-
out filing for bankruptcy, something 
known as informal bankruptcy. In that 
case, if the loan is secured by a house 
or a car, lenders can seize the house or 
the car, a process legally called foreclo-
sure. If the loan is unsecured, such as 
credit card debt, lenders will imme-
diately start adding finance charges 
and late fees to the amount owed. 
They will also likely make phone calls 
and write letters soliciting payments. 
Shortly after that, unsecured lenders 
typically sell their debts to collection 
agencies. Unsecured creditors as well 
as collection agencies can also sue the 
debtor and obtain a court judgment 
against the debtor. They collect the 
judgment by garnishing the debtor’s 
wages.3
Individuals who choose informal 
bankruptcy over formal bankruptcy 
and debt payment are often those 
who do not have regular jobs, assets, 
or bank accounts. This means that 
even if a creditor obtained a judgment 
against a debtor, it would be nearly 
impossible for the creditor to collect on 
it. In their study of informal bank-
ruptcy, Amanda Dawsey and Lawrence 
Ausubel point out that high bankrupt-
cy costs also contribute to informal 
bankruptcy.
HOW DOES CHAPTER 13
BANKRUPTCY WORK?
 Figure 2 lists the basic steps of 
a typical Chapter 13 case. The case 
starts with the debtor’s submitting a 
petition and a repayment plan. Prior to 
April 2006, the filing fee for a Chapter 
13 case was $185; it’s now $235 plus a 
$39 miscellaneous administrative fee. 
In general, the filing fee is due at the 
time of petition. The court sometimes 
may allow the debtor to pay this filing 
fee in installments if the debtor cannot 
2 The state median income divides the higher 
half of the population in the state from the 
lower half in terms of income level. In other 
words, half of the population in the state has 
income greater than the median, and half have 
income less than the median.
FIGURE 1
Annual Household Bankruptcy Filing Rate
Total Filings/Total Households
3See Robert Hunt’s Business Review article for 
more details.
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pay all at once.4 If the debtor hires a 
private attorney, he will also have to 
pay the attorney’s fees. The attorney’s 
fees can be anywhere from a couple of 
hundred dollars to a few thousand, de-
pending on the complexity of the case 
and the experience of the attorney.
As soon as a debtor files for bank-
ruptcy, something called the “automat-
ic stay” goes into effect. The automatic 
stay prohibits virtually all creditors 
from taking any action directed at col-
lecting the debts the debtor owes them 
until the court says otherwise. These 
actions include foreclosures, termina-
tion of contracts for deed, repossession 
actions, and lawsuits to obtain judg-
ments on debts and pressure to sell off 
equipment, crops, and livestock.
The petition contains schedules 
A to J, which detail the debtor’s assets 
(real estate assets such as housing, 
and personal assets such as furniture 
and jewelry); income, expense, and 
debts (secured, unsecured priority, 
and unsecured nonpriority); pend-
ing lawsuits, including foreclosures; 
and past income.5  Together with the 
FIGURE 2
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Procedure
4 The filing fee may be waived entirely only for 
individuals who qualify under very strict fee-
waiver provisions.
5 Types of unsecured priority claims include, 
among others, alimony, maintenance and 
support, taxes and certain other debts owed 
to government entities, and money owed to 
employee benefit plans for services rendered 
within the 180 days immediately preceding 
filing of the original petition. Unsecured 
nonpriority claims are mostly credit card debt. 
The plan must pay priority claims in full before 
unsecured nonpriority creditors receive any 
money unless a particular priority creditor 
agrees to different treatment of the claim or, 
in the case of a domestic support obligation, 
unless the debtor contributes all “disposable 


























Proposes a repayment plan22   Q4  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
petition, the debtor must also submit 
a repayment plan that devotes all of 
his disposable income – income net of 
necessary expenses – to the payment 
of claims. 
For a proposed payment plan to 
be confirmed, it must extend for at 
least three years, but it cannot exceed 
five years. It must also be filed in good 
faith. In particular, the plan must 
propose to pay at least as much as the 
value of the assets creditors would 
have received under Chapter 7. Finally, 
the plan must make up all missed pay-
ments on secured debt before submit-
ting payments to unsecured creditors. 
Within a few days after the debtor 
files the bankruptcy petition, the 
bankruptcy court assigns a Chapter 13 
trustee to oversee the case. The trustee 
may be a local bankruptcy attorney, 
who will be very knowledgeable about 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy generally, 
as well as the local court’s rules and 
procedures specifically. In some courts, 
trustees are not attorneys but business 
people with specialized knowledge of 
finance or personal bankruptcy. The 
trustee serves primarily as a mediator 
between the debtor and his creditors. 
In almost all cases, the debtor deals 
mostly with the trustee, and a bank-
ruptcy judge follows the recommenda-
tions of the trustee.
Shortly after his appointment, the 
trustee schedules a section 341 meet-
ing for creditors to attend. This is the 
first court appearance for the debtor. 
At the meeting, creditors will be given 
an opportunity to ask any questions re-
garding the debtor’s financial situation 
that may affect the plan. Although 
they can raise objections, creditors do 
not actively vote on a repayment plan. 
After the meeting, the judge decides 
whether to dismiss the case, reject the 
plan, or confirm the plan.
The plan can be dismissed either 
because it was not filed in good faith 
or because it is not viewed as feasible. 
When the repayment plan is dismissed, 
the case ends. But several important 
consequences remain. First, all liens 
on the debtor’s property are reinstated. 
The automatic stay is lifted. Creditors 
can resume their legal remedies outside 
of bankruptcy to pursue the payment 
of their debts.  Interest (and in some 
cases penalties) that stopped accruing 
during the bankruptcy will be added to 
the debts. In other words, interest and 
penalties are retroactive from the time 
of the stay.
Sometimes, the court does not 
dismiss the case outright. Instead, the 
plan is simply rejected and the debtor 
is given a chance to propose a modi-
fied plan. After modification, the plan 
will again be subject to court decision.
If the plan is confirmed, the debt-
or starts making payments according 
to the confirmed plan.6  The debtor 
will be discharged only upon comple-
tion of the plan. A confirmed plan 
can be renegotiated. For example, the 
debtor can prepay in the event that his 
assets appreciate or he receives addi-
tional income from other sources, such 
as an inheritance. The debtor can also 
convert the case into Chapter 7 with 
the court’s agreement or simply default 
on the confirmed plan and then have 
the plan dismissed. The trustee can 
also force the debtor to alter the plan 
when he observes that the debtor has 
had a substantial increase in income.
CHAPTER 13 BY THE NUMBERS
In my research project with Hülya 
Eraslan and Pierre-Daniel Sarte on the 
realities and dynamics of Chapter 13 
personal bankruptcies, we collected all 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings between 
August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002, in 
the federal bankruptcy court, district 
of Delaware. About 10 percent of the 
cases were excluded from the sample 
because of incomplete information 
resulting either from a filing error 
(deficient filing) or a court recording 
error. Almost all of these excluded 
cases were dismissed subsequently. The 
final sample contained 904 cases.7 At 
the time of the writing of this article, 
about 190 cases remain open.
In another study, Scott Norberg 
and Andrew Velkey examined a sam-
ple made up of 795 Chapter 13 cases 
filed in 1994 in seven federal judicial 
districts, which comprise 14 Chapter 
13 trusteeships. The seven federal ju-
dicial districts are Northern District of 
Georgia, Southern District of Georgia, 
Middle District of North Carolina, 
Middle District of Tennessee, Western 
District of Tennessee, District of Mary-
land, and Western District of Pennsyl-
vania. In each district, a quota sample 
of roughly 1 percent of the Chapter 13 
cases filed in 1994, but not fewer than 
100 cases, was pulled.8
Each sampling approach has its 




actively vote on a
repayment plan.
6Often, debtors start making payments to the 
trustee as soon as they submit their proposed 
plans. The payment minus court expenses 
will be refunded to debtors if their cases 
are dismissed. This requirement militates 
against the possibility of debtors’ lingering in 
bankruptcy court, reaping all the gains without 
making any payments.
7 For the purposes of this article, we do not 
include the 72 cases filed initially under 
Chapter 13 but converted to Chapter 7. Since 
this article was written, more cases have closed. 
See our Working Paper for updated information.
8The data source for both studies is the U.S. 
Public Access to Court Electronic Filing Service 
Center, the federal judiciary’s centralized 
registration, billing, and technical support 
center for electronic access to U.S. district, 






Male  29.8% 36.7%
Female 35.1% 36.3%
Joint filing 35.1% 27.0%
Marriage 41% 40%
Average household size 2.67 2.69 2.50
Homeownership rate 87% 54% 72%
Average monthly income ($) 1646 946 2297
Debt excluding mortgages- 
annual income ratio
1.36 1.29 0.28
With previous filing history 22% 32%
with Eraslan and Sarte are: (i) The 
data are recent. This is important, 
since there was a significant increase 
in personal bankruptcy in the 1990s. 
(ii) For further analysis, it is help-
ful to look at a more homogeneous 
population. For example, if we want to 
examine the effect of family income 
on bankruptcy outcomes, we prefer 
that unobserved differences between 
families in different states not affect 
our results. The benefit of Norbert and 
Velkey’s study is that their sample is 
more representative of the nation as a 
whole. 
WHO FILES FOR CHAPTER 13 
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES?
Table 1 presents profiles of the 
Chapter 13 filers in the two studies. 
To draw a comparison with an average 
household, I’ve also included, when 
available, information derived from the 
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
As can be seen, Chapter 13 filers are 
far from being the most destitute of 
the general population. Both studies 
indicate that these people tend to have 
regular jobs, and the unemployment 
rate among filers is far lower than the 
state or national unemployment rate. 
Thus, they all receive regular incomes, 
although their incomes fall short of the 
national average by 30 to 60 percent.
The majority of the debtors also 
own their homes, and the homeowner-
ship rate among the debtors is 
substantially higher than the national 
average in our more recent sample. 
The homeownership rate is lower 
among debtors than among the general 
population by about 10 percentage 
points in Norberg and Velkey’s sample. 
But the rates among debtors vary quite 
a bit among the seven districts in their 
sample, ranging from 33 percent in 
the Middle District of Tennessee to 
79 percent in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.
Not surprisingly, despite their 
income and assets, the Chapter 13 
filers are heavily indebted. The debt 
to income ratio, excluding mortgages, 
averages 1.36, with a median of 1.02. 
According to the 2001 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, the average debt to 
income ratio, excluding mortgages, is 
0.28 and the median is 0.06 for the na-
tion. Norberg and Velkey found similar 
numbers for their 1994 sample.  
Another remarkable finding is 
that a substantial portion of filers, over 
20 percent in our sample and nearly 32 
percent in Norberg and Velkey’s, have 
filed for bankruptcy previous to the 
case under study. 
In terms of other demographics, 
Chapter 13 filers in both studies do not 
differ much from the general popula-
tion in terms of marital status and 
household size.9
The profiles of Chapter 13 filers 
uncovered in the two studies are in 
contrast to those of Chapter 7 fil-
ers documented by other studies. For 
example, in their study, Scott Fay, Erik 
9We also report filing status by gender, and we 
infer debtors’ gender from their first names.
10 Fay, Hurst, and White’s sample consists of 
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers. Given 
the relatively small number of Chapter 13 filers 
in their sample, the reported sample statistics 
reflect mostly those of Chapter 7 filers.
TABLE 1
Profiles of Chapter 13 Filers
Note: Monthly income is real income constructed by deflating nominal income by the consumer 
price index, setting 1982-84 to 100.




Confirmation rate 82% 77%
Discharge rate 33% 33%
Recovery rate of all debt 27% 30.1%
Recovery rate of secured debt 22% 30.6%
Recovery rate of unsecured debt 16% 19.5%
Subsequent refiling rate 30% 33%
Furst, and Michelle White find that 
Chapter 7 filers have the same rate of 
unemployment as the general popula-
tion.10  The homeownership rate in 
their study is far lower than the general 
population’s. The average monthly 
income is about 50 percent below the 
nation’s average. Most important, filers 
in this study experienced, on average, 
a much higher income drop at the time 
of filing.
HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS THE 
CHAPTER 13 SYSTEM BEEN?
 The success of the bankruptcy 
system depends on how well it serves 
its dual goals: maximizing return to 
creditors by enforcing debtors’ obliga-
tion to repay their debts and providing 
debtors with a financial fresh start by 
discharging some of their debt. The 
two goals are obviously at conflict. Un-
fortunately, the law does not explicitly 
specify how the two goals should be 
balanced.
Even without a precise way of 
evaluating the success or failure of 
Chapter 13, we can make headway 
by thinking about some features of a 
desirable bankruptcy procedure. First, 
all confirmed cases should eventually 
be discharged. Remember, a case that 
is not discharged shifts the debtor 
and his creditors back into a private 
collection procedure. Second, recovery 
rates for unsecured creditors should 
not be lower than those gained from 
other solutions to borrower default. 
From the creditors’ standpoint, a 
higher recovery for unsecured debt is 
the primary advantage of Chapter 13 
over Chapter 7 and other remedies 
outside of bankruptcy. Finally, multiple 
filings should be the exception, not 
the rule, especially for those who 
had successfully obtained a previous 
discharge. 
The Grim Realities of Chapter 
13 Personal Bankruptcy.  I summa-
rize the performance measures in the 
two studies in Table 2. Several findings 
emerge from the two studies. First, 
although a large percentage of Chapter 
13 filers do have their proposed plans 
confirmed, the success rate measured 
by the percentage of cases discharged 
is low.11 In our sample, about 18 per-
cent of the cases remained open as of 
October 30, 2006. Even if we assume 
that all of the cases still open will be 
ultimately discharged, the maximum 
rate of discharge would be 51 percent, 
about half of the cases. In 1994, ac-
cording to Norberg and Velkey, only 
33 percent of the cases obtained a 
discharge. This strongly suggests that a 
substantial fraction of repayment plans 
were unrealistic in the first place, ei-
ther because the debtors were “forced” 
to agree on a plan that demands an 
“unrealistic” amount of repayment or 
because the debtors did not fully take 
into account the possibility of future 
adverse events that would affect their 
ability to pay.12
Related to the low discharge rate 
is the finding that creditors, secured 
and unsecured, receive very little on 
their debts. Specifically, on average, 
secured creditors receive at most 36 
cents on the dollar in our sample, as-
suming that the remaining open cases 
will result in a 100 percent recovery 
rate. In Norberg and Velkey’s sample, 
they receive only 31 cents on the dol-
lar, even though secured creditors are 
supposed to receive full payments in a 
successful Chapter 13 case, according 
to the bankruptcy law.13
11 Recall that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case 
is ultimately either dismissed or discharged. 
A discharge is granted only after a debtor 
successfully finishes his confirmed repayment 
plan.
Note: Eraslan, Li, and Sarte’s sample is as of October 30, 2006.
TABLE 2
Performance of the Chapter 13
Bankruptcy System
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12 Of course, some consumers certainly did 
experience adverse events subsequent to filing 
a plan. But it seems unlikely that plans that are 
unsuccessful between 50 to 70 percent of the 
time can be ascribed to pure bad luck.
13 Because a trustee’s commission is proportional 
to the amount of payments under Chapter 
13, debtors often choose to have their regular 
mortgage or car loan payment outside of their 
repayment plans to reduce the payment amount 
under bankruptcy. Arrears, however, have to be 
paid through repayment plans. Business Review  Q4  2007   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
Unsecured creditors fare worse, 
receiving, on average, at most 31 cents 
on the dollar in our sample and 20 
cents on the dollar in Norberg and 
Velkey’s. Over half of the creditors in 
our sample, secured as well as unse-
cured, receive absolutely nothing and 
just a few cents on the dollar in Nor-
berg and Velkey’s sample.  Although it 
is not directly comparable, according 
to the 2001-2002 Reports of Income 
and Financial Conditions from the 
nation’s commercial banks, the recov-
ery rate for overdue credit card loans is 
23 cents per dollar. 
The payoffs to the creditors are 
strikingly low considering the substan-
tial cost associated with Chapter 13 
bankruptcy cases. In addition to the 
filing fee and attorney’s fees, the debtor 
pays the trustee 3 to 10 percent of each 
payment he makes to his creditors 
through the trustee. Thus, for every 
dollar owed to creditors, it costs 0.6 to 
3 cents in trustee fees alone to collect 
20 to 30 cents. 
Another striking finding that 
emerges from both studies is the high 
rate at which debtors file again after 
the termination of the case under 
study. Of the 726 debtors who have 
exited bankruptcy through either 
discharge or dismissal, 30 percent of 
them filed again at least once. The re-
filing rate is as high as 33 percent for 
Norberg and Velkey’s sample. Even for 
those who emerged successfully from 
their cases through discharge, the re-
filing rate exceeds 20 percent. These 
numbers are very high considering 
that from the mid-1990s to 2006, the 
unconditional bankruptcy filing rate 
for households in general is less than 
1.4 percent in the U.S.
To sum up, the numbers un-
covered from both studies show that 
debtors did not succeed in completing 
their plans in the majority of cases, 
and when they did succeed, a substan-
tial fraction of them were still at risk 
of filing again. Furthermore, creditors 
did not recover much under Chapter 
13: median creditors received close 
to nothing. Thus, the performance of 
Chapter 13 poses a challenge to any 
argument that it is an efficient mecha-
nism for resolving the two objectives 
of the bankruptcy law: debt relief and 
debt collection. In particular, propo-
nents of the 2005 law would instead 
have to base their support for the law 
on the possibility that Chapter 13 has 
strong, desirable benefits in disciplin-
ing consumers, lenders, or both.
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE 2005 REFORM ACT
As mentioned earlier, at the 
center of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act is a means test that intends 
to move a potentially large number of 
would-be Chapter 7 filers into Chap-
ter 13. The purpose is to return more 
money to general unsecured creditors 
than the creditors would otherwise re-
ceive. Whether this purpose is served 
depends on the actual effectiveness of 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy as a means to 
collect debts.
According to the two studies 
reviewed here, however, Chapter 13 
bankruptcy is an ineffective collection 
device. Median creditors receive al-
most nothing after discharge and nearly 
half of debtors do not get their debt 
discharged. If those who end up in 
Chapter 13 because of the new law are 
mostly people who fail the means test 
narrowly, our evidence indicates that 
Chapter 13 collection procedures are 
unlikely to be effective against them.14  
This suggests that the rationale for the 
new bankruptcy act must be sought 
in its other effects, such as deterring 
bankruptcy altogether among those 
who have the capacity to repay.
Of course, what we have discussed 
so far concerns Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
provisions from an efficiency stand-
point after the fact. That is, we ask: 
once a debtor has entered bankruptcy, 
how well does Chapter 13 perform? 
It should be kept in mind that bank-
ruptcy law has broader effects. For 
example, researchers Reint Gropp, 
John Scholz, and Michelle White, 
and Emily Lin and Michelle White 
find that bankruptcy law affects the 
supply of credit. Specifically, lenders 
in states with relatively more generous 
bankruptcy laws take into account the 
potentially higher personal bankruptcy 
filing rate in those states and conse-
quently charge a higher rate to borrow. 
Jeremy Berkowitz and Michelle 
White and Wei Fan and Michelle 
White find that bankruptcy law also 
affects the incentive to take risks, in 
particular, the decision to become 
Lenders in states with relatively more 
generous bankruptcy laws take into account 
the potentially higher personal bankruptcy 
filing rate in those states and consequently 
charge a higher rate to borrow.
14 Recall that a large number of Chapter 13 
filers have income less than their state median 
income. We can’t make the same statement 
for relatively high-income debtors who may be 
forced to choose Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 
7 under the new law because they differ in 
fundamental ways from our sample of Chapter 
13 filers.entrepreneurs. Both homeowners and 
renters respond strongly to increases in 
homestead exemptions in making their 
decisions to be self-employed.  
In light of these studies, an out-
come that looks inefficient conditional 
on the borrower’s entering bankruptcy 
may have positive effects. For instance, 
consumers or lenders may be more 
prudent in their borrowing or lend-
ing decisions when they expect to 
fare poorly in bankruptcy. Whether 
Chapter 13 outcomes we observed can 
be rationalized in a broader view of the 
goals of bankruptcy will require further 
research. 
CONCLUSION
Two recent studies of Chapter 13 
personal bankruptcy provide a detailed 
picture of who enters Chapter 13 and 
how well borrowers and creditors fare. 
The two studies uncover evidence 
that paints a rather grim picture of the 
realities of Chapter 13 personal bank-
ruptcy. Plans are seldom completed 
successfully, creditors recover relatively 
little, and borrowers are very likely 
to re-enter bankruptcy. Thus, these 
findings raise some flags about the 
stated rationale for the reform, moving 
more borrowers from Chapter 7 to 
Chapter 13. To put it simply, despite 
some caveats mentioned in the article, 
based on our research, the Chapter 
13 bankruptcy system has a long way 
to go in terms of providing debt relief 
for borrowers and debt collection for 
creditors. 
REFERENCES
Berkowitz, Jeremy, and Michelle White. 
“Bankruptcy and Small Firms’ Access to 
Credit,” Rand Journal of Economics, 35 
(2004), pp. 69-84.
Dawsey, Amanda, and Lawrence Ausubel. 
“Informal Bankruptcy,” manuscript, 2001.
Eraslan, Hülya, Wenli Li, and Pierre-
Daniel Sarte. “The Anatomy of U.S. 
Personal Bankruptcy Under Chapter 13,” 
Working Paper 07-31 (September 2007). 
Fan, Wei, and Michelle White. 
“Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of 
Entrepreneurial Activity,” Journal of Law 
and Economics, 46 (October 2003), pp. 
543-69.
Fay, Scott, Erik Hurst, and Michelle 
White. “The Household Bankruptcy 
Decision,” American Economic Review, 92 
(June 2002), pp. 708-18.
Gropp, Reint, John Karl Scholz, and 
Michelle White. “Personal Bankruptcy and 
Credit Supply and Demand,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), pp. 217-
51.
Hunt, Robert. “Consumer Debt Collection 
in America,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia Business Review (Second 
Quarter, 2007).
Lin, Emily Y., and Michelle White. 
“Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage 
and Home Improvement Loans,” Journal 
of Urban Economics, 50 (July 2001), pp. 
138-63. 
Norberg, Scott, and Andrew, Velkey. 
“Debtor Discharge and Creditor 
Repayment in Chapter 13,” manuscript.
26   Q4  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
B R